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In every story there is a silence, 
some sight concealed, some word 
unspoken, I believe. Till we have 
spoken the unspoken we have not 
come to the heart of the story.  
–– J.M. Coetzee, Foe 1 
 
Yes, oh dear yes, the novel tells a 
story. 
— E.M. Forster, Aspects of the 
Novel 2 
 
What do we talk about when we talk about the novel? The history of the 
field of inquiry which calls itself “the theory of the novel” — a field in 
which, curiously, the novel is less often an object of theory in its own right 
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than it is an occasion to explore all manner of cultural phenomena, social 
and historical transformations, philosophical propositions, habits and 
practices of living, aesthetic movements — suggests that when we talk 
about the novel we are in fact traversing it on the way to the domains of 
human activity that surround it. Or we undertake the same adventure in 
reverse, reading culture and history into the novel. To talk “about” the 
novel often means talking around it, through it, alongside it; the theory of 
the novel is theory with the novel, the theorization of history, culture, 
politics, economics, aesthetics, and so on, according to how these 
domains — their conditions of possibility, ramifications, limitations, their 
very structures — can be differently illuminated by their refraction 
through the variety of lenses the novel provides. While this testifies to the 
power of the novel to push beyond the apparent and the given, to reveal 
truths irreducible to empirical fact, to expose the organizing principles 
governing institutions and ideologies, to challenge our understanding of 
the world in all manner of important ways — does all this not beg the 
question: What is it? Does literary criticism not have a responsibility, an 
intellectual and ethical obligation, to clarify the concept of the novel prior 
to its use as a theoretical instrument? Otherwise, does this 
instrumentality not risk depriving the novel of its status as literature? 
 Given its conceptual slipperiness and resistance to 
circumscription, it is no surprise that most endeavors to resolve the 
question of the novel make extensive use of non-literary discourses and 
disciplines, as if these secondary subjects can provide the ground upon 
which to prop and anchor the primary matter of the novel, which is so 
shifty that otherwise it, thus its study and criticism, would be groundless. 
For all these reasons and more, and despite the fact that the theory of the 
novel has existed at least in an inchoate form since the turn of the 
nineteenth century,3 we have yet to settle on anything like a consensus 
concerning what, if anything, the novel is. And because the condition of 
any criticism is that it be proper to the field of inquiry to which it is 
addressed, the novel’s conceptual indeterminacy confronts the practice 
and, indeed, the whole idea of literary criticism — its strategies and 
tactics, its desire authoritatively to pronounce truths about its proper 
object, and its ethical orientation — with special challenges. 
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Such as this: Does the novel even exist? Or are there only novels, 
some similar and all unique, such that the general category of the novel 
must be hopelessly incoherent or, at best, an empty signifier to which this 
or that work can be assigned according to any number of (ultimately 
arbitrary) criteria? At best, can we say that what distinguishes the novel 
from every other literary genre is its categorical refusal precisely to be 
distinguished from them? We know that a novel can be epistolary, as 
was its most popular form in the first half of the eighteenth century 
(decades before Richardson’s Pamela or Clarissa, Montesquieu’s Les 
Lettres Persanes was an especially big hit; one contemporary variation 
on this is novels written in text-messages and email exchanges); or they 
can be written in verse; novels have been encoded in hypertext (an early 
example is Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl) or have simulated that 
encoding in print form (most famously, Mark Danielewski’s House of 
Leaves); they can be graphic, or historically factual, or dramatic and 
dialogical; they can run to thousands of pages or limit themselves to just 
a few thousand words; they can be cinematic, as in those scenes from 
Cormac McCarthy’s novels that read like tracking shots on a film set; at 
least since Laurence Sterne we have known that novels are usually but 
not always narratively driven, or can be non-linear in narrative design; 
and we know from Dickens’ The Pickwick Papers to Tom Robbins’ Even 
Cowgirls Get the Blues to emergent digital platforms for serial publication 
that they need not be contained within the covers of a single book. 
This open-ended diversity has precipitated a variety of critical 
containment strategies. One popular strategy involves constructing 
synecdoches to show that the form and history of the genre are mutually 
generated and articulated through some especially momentous cultural 
development, such as the rise of the penitentiary or the development of 
modern historiography or the emergence of modern domesticity.4 This 
would mean that the novel can be constituted as a group according to 
the origin all these disparate examples share. But in addition to disputes 
over the merit of any given synecdoche, this reliance on the notion of 
origins raises still more complications. History (as many of the 
synecdochal theorists well know) is discontinuous and fragmentary and 
every supposed origin therefore is an effect of reading, a result of the 
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critic’s epistemic predispositions, a product of a particular way of seeing 
history, and not a matter of fact. In addition, since any synecdochal 
hypothesis hinges upon some definition of the novel’s formal 
determinants and the origins of those determinants, this approach 
validates a host of other endeavors to discover a common ground that 
lead anywhere but toward critical consensus: the origin of the novel can 
be located in the sixteenth-century Spanish picaresque, or slightly later in 
Don Quixote, or perhaps in Madame de Lafayette’s La Princesse de 
Cléves, or Aphra Behn’s long-form fictions, or as early as Heliodorus’ 
Aethiopica, or even, with Erich Auerbach, the Bible.5 All plausible 
hypotheses, depending upon whether the critic holds that the novel’s 
generic particularity is its foregrounding of plot, irony, history, 
psychological interiority, quotidian mediocrity, verisimilitude, or 
interpretability along a self-contained temporal continuum, or whether 
the novel’s origin is a matter of aesthetic influence, a result of cultural 
cross-pollination, an economic epiphenomenon…. 
 But if it is anything other and more than a vector, even an 
especially powerful vector, of cultural transmission, if in addition to its 
historical function, theoretical usefulness, ideological orientation, political 
potential, or philosophical interest, the novel also names a modality of 
the literary, then it is the task of literary criticism to respond to the 
question of the novel before the concept of the novel is put to use. 
In the following essay I aim to clarify this task, first, by situating (or 
resituating) the novel according to its importance to the development of 
the concept of literature, and second, by situating the theoretical history 
of the novel with respect to this concept. To make this second move, I 
divide the theory of the novel into two distinct yet related critical 
tendencies, the taxonomic and the phenomenological, and consider the 
degree to which each tendency departs from or remains true to the 
concept of literature the novel helped generate. This reduction may seem 
like a gross simplification of the vast and diverse work that has been and 
continues to be done on this notoriously complex subject. That may be, 
and certainly there are a variety of exceptions to these two tendencies, 
but I make no claim to offering a comprehensive survey of the field of 
novel studies. This would be a Sysiphean effort rather like counting the 
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trees in an ever-growing forest, while the forest itself remains obscure. 
My purpose in asserting this dualism therefore is a heuristic one: it 
permits us to draw into relief the epistemic and philosophical 
underpinnings of the theory of the novel in order to show how its 
dominant critical sensibilities can complement one another not despite 
but because of their divergence. In this way, through this 
complementarity, we can clarify the fundamental concepts at stake in the 
novel and its theorization; we can open theory to a new way of asking 
What is the novel?, a question as basic as it is resistant to any final 
response. And we can see how the theory of the novel is grounded upon, 
rather than against, just this resistance. 
 
I. Taxonomy and Phenomenology 
An object of theory does not precede its theorization. The 
discovery or invention of this fact in the domains of literature and literary 
criticism is also the realization of “literature” as such, as a discrete 
conceptual category and field of endeavor. This realization, moreover, is 
a matter of historical record; it belongs at least initially to the early 
German romantics for whom, as Walter Benjamin makes clear, criticism 
is the constitution at once of its object and of the apparatus which 
theorizes it. Such work is far from arbitrary, but nor is it determined in 
advance of its operations. It entails the discovery of “an immanent 
structure specific to the work itself,”6 an immanence the specificity of 
which is redoubled by the singularity of the critic’s engagement with the 
text, and for this reason is not discovered so much as constructed by this 
critical engagement. The task of criticism therefore is to dis-appropriate 
the text from itself: to show what is most proper to it, to illuminate its 
immanent and radically specific structure, through the critical refraction 
by which this very structure is produced. The structure is an effect of its 
own structuration. In this way, criticism is both analytical and creative, or 
better, it occupies and animates the undecidable limit between analysis 
and creativity. 
Following Benjamin, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy note that the concept of literature around which this notion of 
criticism coalesces — despite the fragmentation and wide dispersion of 
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schools and strategies of literary criticism since the end of the eighteenth 
century, despite romanticism’s relegation to its own small corner of 
literary history by the twinned forces of scholarly periodization and 
disciplinary specialization — remains the basis of literary theory and the 
unifying organizing principle behind our modern critical diversity.7 This is 
obviously true, we should add, since if modern literary criticism is 
expansive and diverse, if its possible permutations are functionally 
infinite, and if it is also, nevertheless, a discrete mode of textual 
engagement in relation to other ways or experiences of reading, this is 
because such variety unfolds from the unifying fundamental concept 
which animates every variation: the romantic concept of literature, the 
concept of “the literary absolute” according to which theory and its object 
are wrapped in an infinitely reflective and co-creative embrace.  
Strangely, then, the subtending unity of the fundamental concept 
of literature is what enables critical experimentation and innovation; the 
absence of such a concept, on the other hand, would leave the work of 
literature no autonomy from criteria of judgment wholly external to the 
work itself, confining the critic to serve these external criteria and 
inhibiting the critical/creative mediation, the dynamic interface between 
reader and text, without which the singular specificity of the work must 
remain obscure. No criticism without literature, to be sure, but also no 
literature without criticism. If this were not so, if literature did not have its 
own fundamental concept, then modern criticism might be limited to the 
sort that preceded the romantics’ insurrection, that aimed to establish 
rules of composition and judge the aesthetic or moral value of a text 
according to the degree to which it adhered to or deviated from these 
rules.8  
Nowhere is this fact that a literary theory and its object are co-
constituted more apparent than in the theory of the novel, not least 
because even for the romantics the novel was, in Friedrich Schlegel’s 
words, “simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry,”9 the aesthetic 
form in which the literary absolute could best be actualized. By 
designating it poetry, Schlegel emphasized that the idea of the novel is 
irreducible to pedestrian or colloquial distinctions between poetry and 
prose because the language out of which it is constructed is no more 
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determined by its referents, by things in the world, than are the words 
and images that populate, say, Paradise Lost or The Faerie Queene. As 
poetry, the novel is literature. As the poetry of poetry, the novel performs 
the work of literature, the work of the literary absolute, by engaging its 
own history, reflecting and refracting and undoing its inherently unstable 
generic parameters, interminably. The novel, in short, is an ongoing 
aesthetic experiment. Small wonder, then, that the genre has from the 
beginning defied rigid classification; in its ascendance to the peak of the 
modern literary marketplace, moreover, it has called into question the 
validity or even the feasibility of any taxonomy of form with respect to 
itself and every other genre. 
And yet, the history of the theory of the novel is largely a history of 
just such a taxonomy. Or better, it is the history of a taxonomic operation, 
in at least two senses: first, the theory of the novel either presupposes or 
aims to establish that, while it is literature, the novel is generically distinct 
from the other forms which occupy this conceptual category, and 
therefore should be situated both within the field of literature and beyond 
or at the limit of the other elements of this field; the theoretical question, 
in this regard, concerns the properties of the form permitting this critical 
differentiation and the articulation of this limit. Whence the synecdochal 
approach or the search for a common origin detailed above. The second 
form of taxonomicity involves imposing the taxonomic operation upon 
the novel itself, so that while the theory of the novel accepts the wide and 
ever-widening variety of examples or instances of its object it 
nevertheless retains a faith in the power of resemblance that justifies the 
grouping of such variety according to a categorical uniformity or 
subtending consistency.  
In fact, both species of taxonomicity are the same. Whether from 
literature to the novel or from the novel to this or that sort of novel, the 
theoretical operation consists in the construction of a relation between 
sameness and difference — in other words, the construction of a system 
of resemblances that are not equivalences, a system which situates the 
differences among its constituent elements relationally, in a manner that 
permits comparison — since in this way the particularity of the genre or 
of any of its examples can be made to shine forth and reveal something 
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about the universality (in the first place, literature as such; in the second, 
the novel as such) to which it belongs. Criticism thus moves dialectically 
from instance to essence and back again, deriving something of the 
essential from the instantial and then imbuing the instance with some 
share of that essentiality that would remain obscure without this critical 
mediation.10 
A key example of the first variation on what we may call the 
taxonomic principle is Ian Watt’s enduring claim that the early novel’s 
defining property is its “formal realism,” a concept he distills from 
associations between the rise of empiricism in the eighteenth century, 
the attendant rise of individualism, and the literary representational 
strategies pioneered most powerfully by Defoe, Fielding and 
Richardson.11 By emphasizing form over other attributes and naming 
those authors deserving of canonical representation according to their 
conformity to realist formal innovation, Watt aimed to establish an 
objective, critically rigorous criterion with which to determine the 
difference between the novel and any other sort of prose fiction that 
superficially might resemble it in terms of its length, themes, subject-
matter, and so on. Criticism of Watt’s position, which always takes issue 
with the limitations of his taxonomy but not with the taxonomic principle 
itself, is well known — as a stylistic designation, formal realism is 
exceedingly nebulous; with its emphasis on the novel’s contribution to 
the rise of individualism, it too easily marginalizes important subgeneric 
texts and experiments, including especially those written by women; as 
an exercise in historical correlation, realism to empiricism, it simplistically 
imposes too neat a historical continuity that cannot account for the 
discontinuous reality of its emergence and diversification.12 But despite, or 
rather because of, the nuance and complexity these criticisms bring to 
Watt’s thesis, they extend the taxonomic principle and its application. 
They do not refute but redraw the tables in which texts are sorted and 
their relations or differences articulated. 
This critical tendency is neither arbitrary nor accidental. It is 
consistent with the epistemic shift Michel Foucault locates in the break 
between an older, Renaissance investment in interpretation, which 
presumes some final meaning to which all signs eventually point and in 
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which they merge, and the modern/contemporary concern for 
classification. According to Foucault, the former involves the discovery of 
a truth intrinsic but irreducible to appearances, therefore the operative 
assumption that a cosmic order exists and only wants to be uncovered; 
the modern position, on the other hand, of which the development of 
taxonomy by natural historians like Carl Linnaeus is the greatest emblem, 
constructs such an order through the elaboration of self-contained 
systems of representation whose elements refer not to some presumed 
hidden truth but to one another, thus together not to any external reality 
but only to the systems in which they inhere. The field of vision it 
produces therefore both reveals and conceals: by building a relational 
structure of knowledge, it also excludes or erases any phenomenon that 
is not amenable to the system’s constitutive representational matrix. 
Tellingly, Foucault begins his account of this epistemic rupture and 
reconfiguration not by way of philosophy or natural history or economics 
— all of which are indeed central to his thesis — but with what he 
designates “the first modern work of literature,” Don Quixote. With its 
ironic reversal of romance and reality, with its hero’s refusal or inability to 
see his world as anything other than a reflection of the tales of knight 
errantry through which his desire passes on its way to action, Cervantes’ 
novel is the epitome of the endless play of signification at stake in the 
taxonomic principle. “Don Quixote reads the world in order to prove his 
books,” in order “to transform reality into a sign,” so that here “language 
breaks off its old kinship with things and enters into that lonely 
sovereignty from which it will reappear, in its separated state, as 
literature,” as the domain in which is made “endless sport of signs and 
similitudes.”13 If the move from interpretation to classification marks a shift 
in the order of knowledge from a moment at which words were the signs 
of things to one in which words are the signs of other words, other signs, 
interminably and indefinitely, always within a hermetic and self-referential 
system, it is the novel which announces or even precipitates this 
epistemic rupture and emergence of a new logic of signs according to 
which reality is an effect of its representations, and not the other way 
around. 
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Yet the theory of the novel, with its stated or covert reliance on 
taxonomicity, with its belonging to a modality of thought that establishes 
rather than uncovers the order of things according to its self-wrought 
systems of organization and classification, seems to have forgotten that 
an inaugural instance of its object of concern, Don Quixote, was and 
remains a vituperative mockery of any system of thought that would 
differentiate and grid its elements according to its own epistemic 
conceits and then present this grid as anything other than a reflection of 
the system operator’s own desire. Don Quixote is simultaneously the 
emblem of the new era of taxonomicity and the sympathetic subversion 
of this very emblem; in this way, it does not yearn nostalgically for the 
epoch of interpretation it supplants but opens an abyss of signification, 
an “endless sport of signs and similitudes,” a game in which there are no 
winners and losers, no rights and wrongs, no truth and falsity — only 
fiction, to which even reality itself now belongs. Every iteration of the 
theory of the novel, insofar as its procedures can be traced to the 
taxonomic principle, thus repeats and reifies Quixote’s fallacy, which, 
from Cervantes’ pen, is both charming and ridiculous. 
Because theory and its object are co-constituted, and because the 
immanent structure specific to the novel is this ironic doubling and 
redoubling, this playful self-subversion, such critical reification may seem 
unavoidable. But there is another trajectory of the theory of the novel, one 
that historicism old or new makes appear quaint or imprecise because 
this other direction is not primarily taxonomic, not concerned with the 
problem of classification. This other, phenomenological branch of theory 
asks the question of the novel in order to reveal within the question itself 
something fundamental about human experience and its historical 
reconfiguration along an axis of ontological displacement. 
To understand what is here meant by phenomenology we should 
begin with one of the most significant contributors to the 
phenomenological question of the novel: Mikhail Bakhtin. Although his 
importance to the history of novelistic taxinomia is indisputable, consider 
that before Bakhtin enumerated the properties of novelistic form or the 
theory of the carnivalesque he first considered the peculiarity of the novel 
with regard to all prior existing genres, its inherent instability, thus its 
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defiance of any rigid critical apparatus or conceptual frame, as well as 
the profound effect the novel has had on every other literary genre — all 
in terms that do not reference but nevertheless harmonize with Friedrich 
Schlegel’s conception of the novel as a site of unending aesthetic 
reinvention. Schlegel famously asserted that literature “should forever be 
becoming and never be perfected”; Bakhtin dubbed the novel “the genre 
of becoming,” emphasizing that it “is the only genre that was born and 
nourished in a new era of world history and therefore it is deeply akin to 
that era, whereas the other major genres entered that era as already 
fixed forms, as an inheritance.”14 The novel’s deep kinship with the 
modern era, moreover, is the source of its power to re-open these prior 
existing forms by inviting, even demanding, aesthetic and generic 
experimentation. This methodological consideration — How should we 
regard the novel? — is at its core a phenomenological one because 
Bakhtin recognizes that the structure of the question must be organized 
in light of the modern predicament in which we, all of us, not just the 
critics, find ourselves: from this vantage, the predicament of perpetual 
becoming.  
Perpetual becoming does not imply rootlessness but 
unrootedness. It means waywardness without telos, exile without return, 
in juxtaposition with a prior, more purposive and determined form of 
being. Against the critical movement from instance to essence and back 
— against the taxonomic principle — Bakhtin imposes a paradoxical 
truth: the essence of the novel is its very inessentiality, and it is this 
essential inessentiality which is the strange core of its historical and, we 
should add, ontological significance. 
Why ontological? The novel is the modern genre, the genre of 
modernity, not only because its deep kinship to its historical context 
entails a constant aesthetic reinvention according to the dynamics of that 
history, not only because its infinitely variable permutations track and 
reflect wider transformations in language, thought, social order, popular 
sensibility, and so on. The novel is not merely history’s mirror. It is also 
and more profoundly the aesthetic medium which announces the 
groundlessness of modernity; it is the imaginary inauguration of a new 
kind of history as such, a history which has come unmoored from the 
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static sureties of myth and religion. The novel’s dynamism, its constant 
becoming, is the literary correlate of the new mode of human being that 
emerges with modernity, the modern subjectivity which is fatally 
disconnected from any final guarantor of meaning or predetermined 
destiny, which forges its own meaning through the destiny it creates 
rather than discovers. 
Georg Lukács was the first to sense the full stakes of this 
disconnection: that the novel marks a break with the era of the epic and 
therefore is a primary indicator of a general, ontological shift toward a 
precarious modernity.15 Following from this, Benjamin offers the clearest 
and most moving characterization of the lived consequences of this 
ontological shift, that is, of the radical difference the novel introduces into 
quotidian human experience. For Benjamin, the rise of the novel marks 
the decline of the storyteller, of storytelling, which is no trivial matter. It 
entails the collapse of “something that seemed inalienable to us, the 
securest among our possessions […]: the ability to exchange 
experiences.”16 This is so, according to Benjamin, for patently material 
reasons. However inessential the novel form may be, it is distinguished 
from the story (and the epic) by its “essential dependence on the book,”17 
a dependence upon the advance of printing technologies and their 
facilitation of emergent literacies among the burgeoning middle class. 
The novel is the literary variation of art in the era of technological 
reproducibility. 
“The birthplace of the novel,” Benjamin further notes, “is the solitary 
individual, who is no longer able to express himself by giving examples of 
his most important concerns,” the individual isolated in his own 
experience and increasingly incapable of communicating that 
experience with others. This is more than an effect of the individuation of 
the narrative subject — of the break with the allegorical and the 
theological, the birth of the novelistic character, the centralization of 
narrative around “particular individuals having particular experiences at 
particular times and at particular places” that Watt situated within the 
epistemological shift toward empiricism.18 Beyond the emergence of 
early novelistic form and its complementary relation to the Enlightenment 
ideology of individualism, Benjamin notes what the novel’s essential 
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dependence upon technological reproducibility and its material supports 
means for the experience of reading. Whereas storytelling is an oral 
exercise and therefore requires to be shared among a community of 
speakers and listeners — the epic, of course, is in print form only the 
inheritance or textual translation of an oral tradition — novels are read in 
solitude and silence. They individualize the experience of narrative on a 
conceptual, formal, epistemological, but finally experiential level.19 This is 
why the novel fractures the human community, alienates us from what 
had seemed inalienable, disappropriates the human of what had 
seemed most proper to it. 
So when we ask the question of the novel phenomenologically, we 
are in effect asking after the methodologically proper means of revealing 
and situating the novel’s close connection to the existential waywardness 
characteristic of the modern human condition, especially if the novel is 
bound to the problematics of technological reproducibility. To think this 
connection, the theory of the novel therefore cannot be confined to a 
technical (taxonomic, teleological, historicist, materialist) apparatus, but 
must persistently interrogate and reinvent its own methods — not simply 
because the novel is always moving, always changing, and therefore 
demands a theoretical and conceptual nimbleness that can keep pace, 
but also because its persistent dynamism, its essential inessentiality, 
radically transforms the experience of literature, thus also the relation 
between literature and experience in ways that promote but also can 
defy or subvert technical thinking. This transformation deserves to be 
called ontological, moreover, and ought to be approached 
phenomenologically because it announces and provokes a radical 
change in what it means to be a human in the world, thus also what 
“world” means, thus also what “being” means. 
Considering the novel’s importance to the romantic conception of 
the “work of literature” as a verb rather than a noun, a dynamic interplay 
of reader and text, criticism and creation, the phenomenological 
trajectory of the theory of the novel is no mere alternative to the 
hegemony of the taxonomic principle. Like Don Quixote, it takes off from 
and subverts that principle; in identifying a phenomenon called the novel, 
it stands upon the ground prepared by the taxonomic tendency, but it 
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does so in order to push itself toward the existential groundlessness 
proper to its area of concern, and in this way requires theory to confront 
its own persistent impropriety with respect to the phenomenon it 
engages. The phenomenological question of the novel acknowledges 
but also defers the question of the novel’s generic essence, and calls into 
question any such effort toward essentiality. If the taxonomic iteration of 
the question, What is the novel?, presupposes in its very grammar the 
existence of a questioning subject and an object in question, this second 
iteration foregrounds the “is” which joins and separates subject and 
object, binding them in a mutually constitutive articulation which is also 
the hinge of the literary absolute. Prior to positing the question itself, then, 
we have to consider more exhaustively the structure of the question 
beyond and before its theoretical deployment, to which structure we now 
turn. 
 
II. Structure and its Other 
To investigate the structure of the question is not to reject but to 
take off from the taxonomic principle. Without the seemingly endless 
proliferation of critical outcomes it informs, even and especially if they 
result from a technical apparatus of thought, we could not see the task 
before us, which thus follows chronologically but is yet logically prior to 
the various and prolific attempts by theorists of the novel to anatomize 
the genre. We begin with a mass of observations, attempts at conceptual 
or historical synthesis, complementary or conflicting interpretations, and 
so on, because all this discloses the novel as a problem to be thought. 
But to remain at this level, to devise taxonomies of novelistic tendencies 
and types, to build a definition of the concept of the novel by way of a set 
of commonalities among existing examples (which, of course, produces 
their very exemplarity through their collection and deployment), to delimit 
the concept according to what novels have in common despite or 
beneath their differences, to march along with the procession of theories 
of the novel—this is a necessary but ultimately preliminary, propaedeutic 
endeavor. If we want to examine the fundamental structure of the 
question which directs the theory of the novel, has always directed it 
despite the vagueness and uncertainty of its articulation, we have to 
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proceed in reverse, as it were, moving from existent theories of the novel 
backward to their reason, ratio, and ground. What we need is a 
formulation of the fundamental concepts that orient and animate the 
question of the novel. 
On the trail of the structure of the question, our first (still 
propaedeutic) stop should be Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in 
General Linguistics, particularly Saussure’s early remark that the study of 
languages can only take us so far toward understanding language as 
such, because languages are dynamic and unstable and bound to the 
ever-shifting realities of their social and historical contexts. One cannot 
move from structure to practice without affording logical priority to the 
construction and analysis of structure — here, the structure of the 
question, “What is language?” What are we asking about when we are 
asking about language, and how does our orientation toward the 
problem effect or condition our possible results and our understanding of 
linguistic practice? Whence semiology, the fabricated structure, the new 
science of signs. 
So, too, with the theory of the novel. And yet, the novel’s intimate 
relation to the modern human experience, with all its existential 
homelessness, waywardness, open-endedness and uncertainty; the 
novel’s historical contingency and concomitant generic fluidity; its 
reliance upon technological reproducibility — all this demands a 
structuration that exceeds the methodological parameters of semiology, 
for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, because language 
and the novel are related but finally distinct phenomena. Semiology 
bears upon the structure of language; the theory of the novel bears upon 
the structure of the relation between the art of language — what is called 
literature — and the unstable historicity of the human. This is to say, the 
theory of the novel concerns the particularly modern mode of aesthetic 
mediation by which human experience is narratively organized and 
made potentially meaningful. Following from this, yet more basically, 
Saussure’s brand of structuralism is insufficient to our task because the 
specific historicity of the novel, the shift it performs in literature and 
culture from the transcendental (timeless, fixed) to the immanent, from 
the poetic to the prosaic, from the eternal to the historical, disqualifies 
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even the provisional establishment of the sort of metalanguage at stake 
in Saussure. 
This, of course, is already true of language, as well, which is why 
Saussure’s inaugural semiology required its appreciative complication 
concerning its tendencies toward the transcendental, toward the 
development of a metalanguage, as in Derrida’s Of Grammatology or, in 
a different register, Lacan’s axiom that there is no Other of the Other. Like 
language, then, “the novel” cannot name an atemporal, transcendental 
abstraction that would limit its existent manifestations; the concept of the 
novel instead must be grounded in the ascertainment of its immanence, 
according to the experience of the novel which necessarily precedes its 
conceptualization. 
Following the intellectual tradition in which appear the vital 
correctives introduced into Saussure’s thought by the likes of Foucault, 
Derrida and Lacan, the best precedent to our task is that other key to the 
so-called “linguistic turn” in humanistic inquiry, Martin Heidegger. From 
the beginning, Heidegger’s effort to salvage the question of being from 
the history of metaphysics in order to revitalize fundamental ontology 
requires a delimitation of the fundamental concepts which orient the 
question, concepts which, for him, have been so thoroughly forgotten 
that we have forgotten their very forgetting. Of course, the question of the 
being of the novel is decidedly not the question of the forgetting of being, 
but on the path to such fundamentality Heidegger introduces an early 
hiatus into the problem of being in order to consider the structure of the 
question — that is, of “the formal structure of the question as such” 
regardless of what it questions, of the orientation toward phenomena 
that posits them as invitations to thought as well as the form such 
thinking takes. This hiatus thus affords us a convenient escape from the 
dubious terrain of analogy, from the temptation to overlay fundamental 
ontology upon the theory of the novel and thereby once again to 
subordinate literature to an extrinsic field of concern that denies its 
specificity in the work of the literary absolute. In other words, we are not 
here “applying” Heidegger to the theory of the novel, but taking a cue 
from the first pages of Being and Time, where Heidegger makes clear 
that the structure of the question is a general phenomenological problem 
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in that it realigns the question away from the “what” of its object of 
concern and toward the prior “how” through which its research 
proceeds. 
Heidegger’s first insight in this regard is that “The totality of beings 
can, with respect to its various domains, become the field where 
particular areas of knowledge are exposed and delimited,” and that these 
areas of knowledge therefore are constituted as responses to the 
“prescientific experience and interpretation” of a given domain. It is this 
prior experience which provides every science, every area of knowledge, 
with its fundamental structures [Grundstrukturen], the configuration of 
limitations that demarcate a field of knowledge, constrain its operations 
to within that configuration, and enable the positive (scientific) 
elaboration of the objects of knowledge appropriate to it.20 Heidegger 
continues: 
Fundamental concepts [Grundbegriffe] are determinations in 
which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of 
a science attain an understanding that precedes and guides all 
positive investigation. Accordingly these concepts first receive their 
genuine evidence and “grounding” only in a correspondingly 
preliminary research into the area of knowledge itself. But since 
each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, 
this preliminary research that creates the fundamental concepts 
amounts to nothing else than interpreting these beings in terms of 
the basic constitution of their being. […] Such laying of foundations 
is productive logic in the sense that it leaps ahead, so to speak, 
into a particular realm of being, discloses it for the first time in its 
constitutive being, and makes the acquired structures available to 
the positive sciences as lucid directives for inquiry.21 
The core insight for our purposes is that an object of knowledge is not 
synonymous with a realm of experience, that such an object thus does 
not precede the process of partitioning and interpreting experience; 
rather, knowledge is the result of an experience mediated through a 
certain way of knowing. Phenomenology therefore is not (or no longer) 
the philosophical domain in which the conditions of subjective 
engagement with a world are delimited, but the name for an effort of 
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thinking that traces the elaboration of these very conditions back to the 
experience they mean to treat, and to the attendant fundamental 
concepts that structure the treatment. 
The other of a structure is its foundation, its ground, that upon 
which it is built, without which it could not stand, its ownmost condition 
of possibility, which is thus inseparable from but irreducible to the 
elements overlaid upon it. To see how we can return all this to the theory 
of the novel, it is worthwhile to take one more detour through the best 
exportation of Heidegger’s insight in this regard, Lacan’s eleventh 
seminar, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, which in its 
very title invokes (if obliquely) the above passages from Being and Time. 
Early in the seminar Lacan notes Heidegger’s “propaedeutic” significance 
to his teaching,22 by which we should understand that he is not here 
applying Heidegger to psychoanalysis so much as repeating the 
phenomenological gesture, symptomatically as it were, through its 
displaced expression in another domain of inquiry and, more importantly, 
another domain of human experience, called the unconscious. At the 
core of this displacement is a localized repetition of Heidegger’s 
operative claim that the history of metaphysics is a history of the 
forgetting of the question of being and a forgetting of this forgetting. 
Lacan’s return to Freud posits just such a problem among his 
contemporaries, who called themselves Freudians even as they betrayed 
the ethical foundation of the Freudian discovery and reduced 
psychoanalysis to a technical apparatus devoid of the conceptual 
malleability required by its object of concern. In short, for Lacan 
psychoanalysis has forgotten Freud and, with him, the fundamental 
concepts that guided the practical elaboration of the unconscious; by 
nevertheless retaining Freud’s name, psychoanalysis, like metaphysics 
qua Heidegger, has forgotten this very forgetting. 
It was because of this predicament that Lacan sought the 
fundamental concepts — the unconscious, repetition, the transference, 
and the drive — that could correct the wrong turn in psychoanalysis. By 
naming them, Lacan meant to push psychoanalysis back to its infancy, 
just as Freud had done with the Enlightenment, not in order to establish a 
proper origin to which fidelity was owed like an arbitrary allegiance but to 
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reveal what the history of psychoanalysis after Freud has repressed, how 
that repression continues to haunt psychoanalytic praxis, and why a 
structure that disregards its foundation cannot stand. Simply put, if 
psychoanalysis is not a theory but a practice and an experience, if it is 
less science than phenomenology, this means its fundamental concepts 
are originary, not original; they develop out of an encounter with the 
phenomena psychoanalysis means to address, phenomena that in fact 
call the position of the analyst into being, even though it is from this 
position that the articulation of its fundamental concepts proceeds. As 
originary, they are both cause and destination of the desire of the analyst. 
So, what is at stake here is a reconfiguration of the analyst’s desire. 
Is the object of such a desire to ensconce psychoanalytic discourse 
within the dubious domain of the transcendental, to make of it a dogma 
or an authoritative metalanguage with respect to the experience into 
which it inquires? To master the unconscious? The Lacanian answer, 
definitively, is no. The analyst is not a subject but a logical position within 
a certain structure of experience, a hole in discourse into which the 
unconscious is invited to disclose itself. Before its object, analysis is 
always and forever a student, not least because the dynamics of the 
unconscious render any conceptual rigidity, any taxonomic classification, 
practically and ethically bankrupt. 
With both Heidegger and Lacan, we therefore can see that the 
structure of the question is not, or not only, important for analytic 
exactitude — and it is, insofar as a domain of inquiry that strays from its 
own fundamental concepts can result in a self-referential analytic 
enclosure that, as Foucault has already taught us, validates itself and its 
own representational procedures while forgetting that its objects of 
knowledge are an effect of their representational mediation and not the 
truth of the things it purports to represent. Following from yet again 
logically prior to this, the phenomenological realignment of the question 
is an ethical concern, a matter of theoretical and practical responsibility. 
What Heidegger and his differential repetition in Lacan teaches the 
theory of the novel is that the latter needs to articulate its fundamental 
concepts in order to inhibit the overlaying of its conclusions upon its area 
of inquiry, the erasure of this overlay, the attendant faith in the truth of 
 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 153 
these illusory conclusions, and finally the effacement of the experiential 
motivation, the very humanity, behind the question of the novel. 
Following Foucault, Heidegger, and Lacan — not only following, but 
repeating them symptomatically, dis-placing them in another field of 
inquiry and another domain of experience — the theory of the novel must 
begin to ask the question prior to the wild variety of responses the 
question of the novel has already provoked. Before we can determine 
what we talk about when we talk about the novel, we must consider: 
What do we ask about when we ask the question of the novel? 
 
III. Propositions: The Situation, Singularity, Community, Desire 
 The following enumeration of what I hold to be four fundamental 
concepts of the theory of the novel in no way constitutes an exhaustive 
or authoritative pronouncement. These are propositions suggesting 
some possible avenues along which the question of the theory of the 
novel might proceed beyond the impasses between the taxonomic and 
the phenomenological, between history and form, politics and aesthetics, 
and so on. My aim with these formulations is to ask: from what particular 
domain of being does the theory of the novel, as a “lucid directive of 
inquiry,” emerge? What sort of experience does the theory of the novel 
treat? And to what extent is this treatment consonant or dissonant with 
its own fundamental concepts? More emphatically, what of the novel has 
been forgotten, repressed, by its own theorization, and how does this 
repressed return, as all repressions do? 
 
1. The situation 
 The novel treats the enigma of the situation withdrawn from the 
certitudes of a purposively driven universe, whether such purposiveness 
is defined theologically, structurally, or historically. Abandoned upon the 
shore of modernity; exiled from the community bound by myth, epic, or 
the shared experience of storytelling; trapped within the ever-shifting 
dynamics of becoming — in the face of such a predicament, such 
perennial uncertainty, such unsituatedness, it is only human to ask: if I 
am not at home in being, then where am I? How did I get here and what 
is happening and where am I going? What is the situation? It is this 
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existential question to which the novel responds, always in a historically 
specific way. This manner of response is why the novel’s historicity is 
inseparable from its intelligibility and why, as such, its paradoxical 
essence is its dynamism, its open-endedness, its inessentiality. 
The problem of the situation therefore reveals why the novel can 
be neither withdrawn from nor circumscribed by its moment. It is both 
history and literature. As history, it presents a narrative tableau or 
snapshot in which are posed a variety of elements, however abstract or 
figurative, which organize the structure of the text’s situation, inviting 
critical apprehension and historiographic description of both its local 
situation and the situation’s aesthetic organization. As literature, the novel 
withholds its final meaning and ensures that every quest for such finality 
will end in failure — even if that quest proceeds under the heading of 
“totalization,” that is, even if the historicist methodology concedes that 
totality is a logical rather than a practical conclusion to its inquiry. It does 
so not only because, as Foucault makes clear with Don Quixote, the 
language of literature is language at play, operating according to the 
semantic rules and cultural conventions which circulate around and 
beyond the words on the page but in ways that creatively exploit and 
manipulate those rules.23 In addition to this, we must note that Foucault’s 
or any theoretical assessment is also historically situated, and that the 
critical practices theory brings to bear on a text or genre are animated by 
the experience of reading — in short, there is no metalanguage, no other 
of the other; no experience takes place in a vacuum. Readers, whether 
critical or casual, cannot but twist and shift the novel’s possibilities 
toward their own moment. And this is good and right since it is why 
novels endure, why the novel as such endures and resists final historical 
enclosure. As both literature and history, the novel is the opening in 
history within which the existential question of the situation takes place 
and repeats itself interminably. 
 
2. Singularity 
 This opening announces a new regard for the excess of the 
human over and against the variety of historical/discursive enclosures 
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which attempt to contain and control it, also a new demand that criticism 
address itself toward this excess. 
At the beginning of this inquiry we noted that an object of theory 
does not precede its theorization, and that this is foundational for both 
literature and literary criticism. One important consequence of this is that 
with literature, with the experience of literature, the distinction between 
subject and object, so operative for the theory of the novel since its 
earliest days and for literary criticism before it, is undone. In lieu of a 
critical subjectivity acting upon its object, the literary absolute instantiates 
a singularity of experience. Singularity is not subjectivity by another 
name. The subject is a metaphysical conceit, while singularity is the bit of 
the human that persists beyond its metaphysical overlay, therefore 
against every effort to transcendentalize it. Singularity is the mark of the 
limit of every modality of the subject, also of every theory of the subject. 
The subject always exists within and through a historically specific 
discourse — novelistic discourse, for instance, which from the start was 
concerned with representing the (modern, individualized) subject 
formally and thematically — and therefore is structured by that discourse 
and can exist only within its limits. Singularity, however, names a 
dimension of the human that resists generalization or is this very 
resistance. It operates at the limits of representation, pushes against 
these limits, therefore defines its limits always in its own way, and in so 
doing reveals the radical peculiarity of every instance of the human. 
Every effort at its articulation inevitably results in an intransigent 
remainder of language and sense, and it is this remainder that demands 
to be read and ensures the possibilities of reading are inexhaustible.24 
The novel marks the realization of this demand, in a double sense: 
historically, the novel is the aesthetic category through which the Jena 
romantics discovered the workings of the literary absolute before and 
beyond the latter’s intellectual formulation; it is the literary mode, “the 
poetry of poetry,” in which the co-constitutive relation between creativity 
and critical reflection is made real. The second meaning of realization 
here involves the reification of this discovery through a romantic practice 
of reading and writing that foregrounds an experience resistant to 
discursive translation or assignation. The novel thus joins the situation 
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with the singularity it informs but can never exhaust, or shows the 
singularity at stake in every situation and every attempt to mediate it 
through the work of literature. 
 
3. Community 
The situation and the singularity of literature obviously are not 
unique to the novel, but we are here designating them fundamental 
concepts animating the novel’s theorization because they are means of 
designating the novel as an event in the history of representation, an 
event that perpetually renews itself in every novel, but not only there.25 It 
influences other aesthetic modes (poetry, drama, cinema, even the 
plastic arts) so profoundly that insofar as our concepts are applicable to 
these other modes it is to the extent that they operate novelistically. We 
have already seen with the novel’s history of experimentation and formal 
diversity, and from the perpetual crisis it invokes within the terrain of 
taxonomicity, that the same is true in reverse, as well: that the novel is a 
highly suggestible medium. We also know that the problem with any 
effort to install the extreme meandering of the novel upon a common 
ground by way of a common, even if fragmentary, origin is that every 
origin is a myth, reified as an after-effect of reading, and not a matter of 
empirical historical fact. Even the opposition between the epic and the 
novel that initially animated the phenomenological approach risks 
committing this fallacy of the origin. 
The theory of the novel, then, designates what Jean-Luc Nancy 
calls an inoperative community, both because of the uniqueness of each 
of its objects of concern and because the experience of reading which 
animates that concern is a testament to the singularity of the critic’s 
inherently creative engagement. It is indeed a community, but not one in 
which each of its constituent elements — critics and texts, schools and 
subjects, origins and conclusions — can be fused into the homogeneity 
of a common being. Instead, the theory of the novel addresses a “being-
in-common,” the common uncommonness of every singularity. Here, “the 
totality of community […] is a whole of articulated singularities” in which 
articulation “does not mean organization.” On the trail toward what this 
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announces for literature, for what Nancy calls “literary communism,” he 
continues: 
By itself, articulation is only a juncture, or more exactly the play of 
the juncture: what takes place where different pieces touch each 
other without fusing together, where they slide, pivot, or tumble 
over one another, one at the limit of the other — exactly at its limit 
— where these singular and distinct pieces fold or stiffen, flex or 
tense themselves together and through one another, unto one 
another, without this mutual play — which always remains, at the 
same time, a play between them — ever forming into the 
substance or the higher power of the Whole. Here the totality is 
itself the play of the articulations. This is why a whole of 
singularities, which is indeed a whole, does not close in around the 
singularities to elevate them to its power: this whole is essentially 
the opening of singularities in their articulations, the tracing and 
the pulse of their limits.26 
The novel interrupts the myth of its own origin and refuses to be fused 
into a closed, coherent totality. More than this, the novel imposes upon 
us the intellectual bankruptcy of generic classification because it is 
recalcitrant to all genera, because it categorically denies the priority of 
the law of genre, because it fatally compromises any effort to reduce the 
infinite disparity of its examples to a series of common types. What every 
novel fundamentally has in common with every other is that they are all 
radically unique, and this radical uniqueness is renewed each time the 
novel or its history or, indeed, its theory are picked up and read. This is 
why there are as many theories as there are theorists of the novel, why 
the field remains open, why it is as undetermined and interminable as its 
supposed object. This literary communism, where its constitutive 
articulations play upon and against their own limits interminably and 
incalculably, is the horizon which for the theory of the novel demands 
and remains to be thought. 
We have long known that genres are inherently unstable, that they 
are hegemonic rather than fixed, that they are historically and 
ideologically contingent. And yet, even with the novel’s profound 
challenge to its critical usefulness, genre remains an operative concept 
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for the theory of the novel. It is the aesthetic correlate of the common 
being against which Nancy’s notion of inoperativity is directed, and 
perpetuates the urge to communal fusion literary communism disrupts. 
Genre is a disciplinary concept that inhibits the play of articulations or our 
discernment of that play, to the detriment of the singularity of literature. 
Consider, does Virginia Woolf’s Orlando: A Biography, whose eponymous 
character’s temperament is as contingent and malleable as his/her 
gender, who ages just twenty years throughout the four-hundred year 
history her biography spans, deserve to be considered a fantasy novel? 
What is to be gained or lost by such generic assignation? Is Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Galapagos, which takes place one million years in the future, 
when humans have evolved into sleek-pelted seal-like creatures, a 
science fiction novel, considering Vonnegut’s explicit disdain for that 
subgenre and its fans? Or, since its narrator is the disembodied spirit of a 
man who has been dead for a million years, is Galapagos rather a ghost 
story? Is Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, one of the most celebrated examples 
of the novel, truly a novel at all, or is it a pseudo-novelistic extension of 
seventeenth-century spiritual autobiography? Is Gulliver’s Travels a novel 
despite its formal deviation from the other long-form narratives 
surrounding it, or is it a satirical work of political propaganda, or both? 
Are The Trial or The Castle or Amerika novels, even though Kafka never 
completed them and, since he did not imagine they would ever be 
known beyond his small circle of confidantes, were never definitively 
organized by Kafka himself? Or does this raise the question whether 
every novel, in its own way, is unfinished? Is Finnegan’s Wake a novel, 
and if so, would this force us to consider how Vico’s La Scienza Nuova, 
which Samuel Beckett considers the blueprint for Joyce’s text, is also a 
novel or should be read novelistically? Similarly, does Naguib Mafouz’s 
Arabian Nights and Days belong to the older folk tradition from which the 
text takes its inspiration, or does it perhaps retroactively reconstitute the 
1001 Nights, from Antoine Galland’s first translation and publication in 
1704 to its contemporary variations, as a novel and not, or not only, an 
Orientalist compendium? 
 While it would be instructive to venture an answer to any of these 
questions, the point for our purposes is that the fact they can be posited 
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at all severs the cordon sanitaire between the novel and other aesthetic 
modalities, between this or that subspecies of the novel, between 
literature and philosophy, or finally between fiction and truth. The 
community which is oriented-but-not-organized by the question of the 
theory of the novel is an inoperative one because it concerns a 
community of texts defined not by what each of its elements has in 
common, not by the features of a text that permit its being positioned 
here or there, but by every text’s common uncommonness. This is 
redoubled within the community of readers, lay or critical, by the 
irreducible experience of reading that instantiates them as community. 
And this means that the question of the theory of the novel also asks 
where literature itself begins or ends, asks the question of the 
undecidable limit between the work of literature and the wider human 
experience. The is in the question, What is the novel?, the copula which 
joins and separates the novel’s whatness with its thatness, is the site of 
the (non-)relation among singularities out of which community emerges. 
The question is not a call for definition but an opening that perpetually 
resists critical certitude or is this very resistance. Let us say, finally, that 
the theory of the novel is the theorization of literature’s resistance to its 
own theorization. 
 
4. The desire of the critic 
 When we are confronted with a dynamic resistance that 
perpetually invites theorization but refuses totalization, an interminable 
resistance, we hear an echo of the unconscious and particularly of the 
structure of unconscious fantasy. According to psychoanalysis, the 
purpose of investigating desire is not to arrive at its final determination, 
but to assume an ethics of the question that relinquishes every ambition 
toward theoretical mastery. Such an ethics begins with the axiom that a 
fantasmatically motivated quest for totality, for mastery, is driven by and 
sustains an anxiety of incompleteness. In other words, it is because we 
are constitutively split along the pole of desire that we seek to close that 
split, to find a satisfaction that would put an end to desire, and it is for the 
same reason that this quest for satisfaction is at bottom a questing after 
death. In Nancy’s more politicized language, “Immanence, communal 
 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 160 
fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community 
that is governed by it.”27 To combine these two discourses: community 
exists only insofar as it is inoperative, only if its elements cannot be put to 
work in service to some unifying enterprise, only if it is animated by an 
ethics of desire that forestalls its enclosure within a rigid totality. 
Repeating this symptomatically within the theory of the novel, we 
can say that the desire to answer the question of the novel is a desire to 
put an end to it, to arrest the anxiety it invokes. Yet, the history of the 
theory of the novel, when abstracted from its individual instances and 
taken as a whole, reveals that this has never been the desire at stake in 
this domain of inquiry, whether taxonomically or phenomenologically 
oriented. What is the novel? is a question that remains to be asked 
despite the ever-growing panoply of responses because every answer is 
a trace of the literary absolute, a critical and — because of its necessary 
indelibility, because every singularity refuses discursive designation — 
creative mark of the experience of reading. Every such trace therefore 
succeeds in articulating (pace Nancy) something of this experience by 
failing to arrive at what it seeks. The desire of the critic, on this view, is not 
the desire for a final answer to the question of the novel, but the desire to 
go on desiring, to ask the question again and anew, to repeat the 
question in diverse contexts, or with regard to underexamined cultural 
phenomena, or according to particular ideological or moral dispositions, 
or with as yet unforeseeable critical tactics. 
By variously forgetting its indebtedness to the literary absolute, 
foreclosing the singular experience of reading, or operating tautologically 
in search of novelistic essence, the theory of the novel has repressed this 
fact of its own desire. If theorizing the novel is the theorization of 
literature’s resistance to its own theorization, then the desire of the critic 
is the desire to be resisted, the desire to fail to arrive at one’s final 
destination, to go on questing and questioning without the satisfaction of 
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IV. Conclusion: Join the Resistance 
 Novels exist because the novel does not exist — because it is as 
yet incomplete and because its perpetual becoming incompletes every 
instance of its being. Its inexistence is what prompts and makes possible 
the proliferation of its examples. It is not an object to be grasped 
historically or theoretically but a hole in the order of taxonomic 
knowledge, the name for an absence around which literary history and 
theory swirl, by which they are oriented, but which they cannot contain. 
 What does all this imply, finally, for theoretical praxis? In the first 
place, it means that the concept of genre has outlived its use, that sorting 
and sifting novels according to generic criteria, or even separating the 
novel from other genres, imposes an unproductive constraint upon our 
considerations of what a novel is or can be. The taxonomic principle has 
illuminated this fact by giving rise to ever more nuanced but ultimately 
insufficient characterizations of the novel’s formal complexities and 
historical permutations. In its perpetual and self-perpetuating move from 
instance to essence and back, taxonomic criticism reveals the novel’s 
withdrawal from essentiality; every approximation of its essence 
produces not more truth but more, and more inventive, resistance to the 
taxonomic search for truth. In this regard, the taxonomic principle 
generates a negativized map of the novel’s resistance to theorization. If it 
is to work toward the development of a specific structure immanent to 
the work itself, the work of literature, the work of the novel, it should be 
deployed in service to this resistance, so that rather than putting novels 
to work toward some extrinsic theoretical end it can elaborate how the 
novel unworks every attempt at its instrumentalization. 
 The phenomenological approach, meanwhile, foregrounds the 
novel’s intimate relation to the human experience and the open-ended 
incalculability of that experience. It thus clarifies the experiential stakes of 
the question of the novel according to its fundamental concepts: the 
situation which is both historically bound and radically unique; the 
persistence of singularity and its irreducibility to subjectivity, to the 
ideological mechanisms by which the subject is made and to which it is 
subjected; the literary communism, the indefinite play of articulations, this 
does not portend so much as announce; and the desire of the critic 
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which succeeds precisely where it fails to attain what it seeks. To 
assume the challenge of the phenomenological — which, again, would 
be unthinkable without its taxonomic complement — requires an ethical 
realignment of literary criticism away from the false certitudes of literary 
history — not an abandonment of history, but a revision of its critical 
function — and toward the perennial uncertainty and waywardness to 
which the novel is addressed and before which it is a reply. An ethics of 
criticism, then, that examines what can be known or produces 
knowledge in order to trace the limits of the knowable, that reads the 
novel’s inscrutability not in order to contain but rather to care for it, that 
concerns the inscrutable in its very inscrutability. 
 “Yes, oh dear yes,” E.M. Forster nearly laments, “the novel tells a 
story.” But as J.M. Coetzee’s narrator reminds us in his re-writing of 
Robinson Crusoe from the perspective of the woman who never appears 
in Defoe’s story, the feminine voice who is everywhere in the original text 
but nowhere present in the words on the page, “In every story there is a 
silence, some sight concealed, some word unspoken, I believe. Till we 
have spoken the unspoken we have not come to the heart of the story.” It 
is this still-beating heart we talk about when we talk about the novel, and 
we talk about it because it is a destination always on the horizon, to 
which we have not yet and perhaps never can arrive. The theory of the 
novel is the living monument to this failure to arrive, the trace of the 
novel’s withdrawal from presence and from each instance of its 
presencing, and the response to the seduction of its ever becoming and 
never being. The question of the novel, the fact that we still ask this 
question, is no scandal. What is the novel? is incontrovertible proof that 
the novel is because it does not exist. 
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